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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GARY LEE KINGSTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
CaseNo.970485-CA 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction of one count of conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
201 (1995) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). Because of the degree of this 
offense, this Court has original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was the trial court's finding sufficient to allow into evidence the co-conspirator's 
recitation of defendant's conversation about mace and a BB gun? This Court will not 
disturb the trial court's admissibility ruling "unless it clearly appears that the lower 
court was in error." State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313,1316 (Utah App. 1986) (discussing 
admission of co-conspirator's statement under hearsay exception); State v. Chavez, 840 
P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992) (same). 
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RELEVANT PROVISION 
Rule 801. Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal 
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication 
or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) 
the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the 
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within 
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, 
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts 
Independent Evidence of Conspiracy 
On January 27, 1997, Valerie Kim Strait went to visit a friend at the U.S. Ski 
Team office in Park City, Utah (R. 202). Standing by the office and next to the 
adjacent First Security Bank were two men, Michael Clay and the defendant, huddled 
together smoking cigarettes and talking (R. 204). Ms. Strait noticed them because they 
looked out of place, i.e., "[t]hey looked different than the person that you would see on 
the street in Park City" (R. 211). Wearing brand new tennis shoes instead of ski boots 
and multi-layered street clothes instead of ski apparel, the two gentleman stood out in 
that cold, snowy Park City January (id.). 
The next afternoon, making a delivery from her gift basket business, Ms. Strait 
returned to the ski offices, where she again saw Mr. Clay and the defendant, wearing 
the same clothes and standing in the same location as the day before (R. 206). This 
time when she entered the ski office, she mentioned the duo to the personnel, who 
eventually called the police (id.). 
Officer Sherman Farnsworth responded to the call and, upon arriving, noticed 
the defendant walk off at a fast pace upon seeing the police car (R. 221-22). Before 
responding to the officer's call to stop, defendant had walked about fifty to seventy feet 
away (id). Officer Farnsworth was struck by the multiple layers of clothing defendant 
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was wearing and the disparate stories he heard from defendant and Mr. Clay about their 
presence in Park City (R. 242-44). When asked why he was in Park City and how he 
got there, defendant told the officer that he and Mr. Clay had hitchhiked up to see the 
sights (R. 228). At the same time, Officer Farnsworth heard Mr. Clay tell a different 
police officer that a friend had brought them to Park City to go skiing (id.). When the 
officer interviewing Mr. Clay yelled out that he had found a weapon (a BB gun and a 
can of mace), Officer Farnsworth handcuffed and arrested the defendant (R. 234-35). 
At the police station, the officers had Mr. Clay and the defendant take off their 
different layers of clothes: Mr. Clay had seven different layers of different types of 
clothes; the defendant had on five different layers of different types of clothes (R. 234). 
While at the Summit County Jail, defendant told two different inmates that he 
intended to rob the First Security Bank or anyone coming out of that bank with a 
bankroll (R. 265; 273). To Wesley Gillmor he specifically said that he and his partner 
were waiting for someone to come out who they would then rob (R. 266). Craig 
Coombs reported that defendant said he and Mr. Clay were "staking out the bank to rob 
it" and "waiting to rob somebody going in or out" (R. 273). Defendant also told 
Coombs that he had a 9 mm Baretta but had thrown it in the snowbank when he saw the 
police (id). 
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Co-conspirator Clay's Testimony1 
Michael Clay originally met defendant in Elko, Nevada and they planned to meet 
again in Salt Lake City (R. 292). Shortly after getting together again, defendant started 
talking about how Park City was a prime target for crime because people there were 
more naive than in a regular city (R. 296). Defendant told Clay how they could just sit 
outside a bank and wait for the right person to come along with a bankroll so they 
could rob him (R. 297). Defendant told Clay to wear several layers of clothing so they 
could change their look after a robbery; he also persuaded him to take mace and a BB 
gun, telling him that it was not illegal to carry such items (id.). According to Clay, on 
the first day of their stake-out, they targeted one person, an elderly man who drove a 
burgundy van, but defendant said to take note of the time he came to the bank and they 
would get him the next day (R. 298). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly found that co-conspirator Clay's testimony was 
supported by independent evidence of a conspiracy and that the statements he 
recollected about weapons were made during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. Consequently, all defendant's statements were admissible under the co-
conspirator hearsay exception. 
Clay pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor attempted theft in exchange for truthful 
testimony about defendant (R. 294). 
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ARGUMENT 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FOUND BY A 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT AND CLAY WERE INVOLVED IN A 
CONSPIRACY, ALL CLAY'S CONVERSATIONS 
WITH DEFENDANT THAT OCCURRED IN THE 
COURSE AND IN FURTHERANCE OF THE 
CONSPIRACY WERE ADMISSIBLE. 
Defendant contends that the trial court's finding of a conspiracy was insufficient 
to allow into evidence Clay's testimony about defendant's statements about mace and a 
BB gun.2 In making this claim, however, defendant misinterprets rule 801(d)(2)(E), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and the case law that has interpreted it. A trial court finding 
of independent evidence does not mandate a specific listing of statements that can be 
included in the testimony. It requires only that the statement have been made in the 
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) makes admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, 
testimony of a co-conspirator of statements made "during the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy." Utah R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (1997). To qualify for this hearsay 
exception, the out-of-court statement must be offered against a party-opponent and 
made by a co-conspirator of the party during the course of and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986). Additionally, before 
introducing the testimony, the State must also provide "evidence independent and 
2
 Brief of Defendant at 6. 
Page 6 of 11 
exclusive of the conspirator's hearsay statements themselves, showing the existence of a 
criminal joint venture and the defendant's participation therein. ... [and also] the 
declarant's membership in the criminal venture." In other words, the State here was 
obligated to show other evidence that defendant was in a conspiracy with Clay. Id. 
Defendant does not object to the trial court's overall finding of conspiracy, which was 
made in response to his objection before Clay's testimony.3 He only claims that 
because the finding did not specifically mention the weapons, Clay's statements about 
The Court finds from the following evidence, both direct and 
circumstantial evidence, the existence of the criminal conspiracy: The 
loitering of the defendant and the coconspirator in front of the bank 
over a two-day period, the defendant's flight at the appearance of a 
police officer, the inconsistent stories of the defendant and the alleged 
co-conspirator given separate handling by the police officers at the 
scene, the presence of weapons on the person of the alleged 
coconspirator, presence of multiple layers of clothing on both the 
defendant and the alleged coconspirator to suggest not simply bundling 
up for the cold, but some other purpose because of the extensive 
layering that was done, and the fact that both seemed to be consistent in 
their actions; and perhaps most convincingly, the defendant's statement 
to two separate inmates that he and an alleged coconspirator had been 
planning to rob the bank or someone carrying a bag of money from the 
bank. 
The Court believes that the force and effect of all of these 
separate statements and other evidences that have been brought into this 
case establish more likely than not that there was an existence of the 
criminal conspiracy independently of any testimony of the conspirator 
and that the threshold has therefore been met under Rule 801(dX2)(E) 
to allow the testimony of the alleged conspirator. 
(R. 291-92). 
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the weapons were not included within the co-conspiracy exception and, consequently, 
were inadmissible hearsay.4 
Defendant cites no case for the proposition that a co-conspiracy finding must 
specifically list the type of statements that can be admitted. The Gray court does not 
support the proposed mandate. Once a conspiracy is found, the only limitation to the 
statements that are admissible is that they be made in the course and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. Gray, 111 P.2d at 1320 ("Once a criminal venture is established, it 
cannot seriously be contended that the statements were not made during the course of 
the criminal venture."). Similarly, this Court has ratified a trial court finding of co-
conspiracy that did not expressly list types of statements that could be admitted. State 
v. Chavez, 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992). There, this Court upheld a trial court 
finding similar to the one defendant challenges.3 This Court allowed into evidence a 
variety of statements, none of which were specifically mentioned in that trial court's 
ruling, i.e., phone calls, use, possession, and delivery of cocaine. Id. at 848-50. All 
"Such testimony [of weapons] was introduced without any independent or reliable 
evidence that Mr. Kingson had any knowledge of the possession of those items by Clay." Brief of 
Defendant at 7. 
5
 I specifically find that there was evidence independent and exclusive of 
statements of these individuals. That there was a joint criminal 
venture. That defendant participated in the joint criminal venture and 
that there was membership by the declarant in the criminal venture. 
Chavez, 840 P.2d at 848. 
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those statements were "in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (1997). 
Consequently, the sole issue here is whether Clay's recitations about defendant's 
encouraging him to use mace and a BB gun was in the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. Defendant apparently concedes that the statements were made during the 
course of the conspiracy. A brief review of relevant case law also establishes that these 
statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Under the identical federal counterpart to the co-conspirator hearsay exception, 
any conversation that prompts action is in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United 
States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 133 (7* Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1021 
(1982). Thus, the phone calls and evidence of transportation of cocaine in Chavez 
"furthered" the conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Similarly, defendant's telling Clay to 
take mace and a BB gun with him furthered their planned conspiracy. It was with those 
weapons that the robbery was to be carried out (R. 297). The federal second circuit 
court of appeals illuminates what "in furtherance" means by contrast. United States v. 
Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 99-100 (2d. Cir. 1978) (telling an undercover agent to "be careful" 
was not in furtherance of a conspiracy because such a statement would discourage it, 
not move it along). 
The statements Clay recollected were not of the sort rejected in Lang. Rather, 
they prompted action that furthered the conspiracy like those in Kendall and Chavez. 
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Consequently, they were properly admitted as part of the co-conspiracy exception to 
hearsay. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL   r> 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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